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 A Note on Sequential Auctions
 By DAN BERNHARDT AND DAVID SCOONES*
 This note explores multiobject, sequen-
 tial, private-value auctions. Orley Ashenfel-
 ter (1989), Ashenfelter and David Genesove
 (1992), and R. Preston McAfee and Daniel
 Vincent (1993) document a puzzling "de-
 clining-price anomaly": in sequential auc-
 tions, mean sale prices for identical objects
 fall in later auctions by 0.25-1.5 percent.1
 McAfee and Vincent observe that these
 findings are difficult to reconcile with ac-
 cepted theory. Robert Weber (1983) shows
 that in sequential auctions of identical ob-
 jects with risk-neutral bidders who hold in-
 dependent private values, the expected sale
 prices in each auction are identical. Fur-
 ther, if there is affiliation in values, then
 expected prices should rise in later auctions
 because early auctions release information,
 thereby reducing winner's curse concerns.
 McAfee and Vincent show that risk-aver-
 sion explanations are problematic. Pure-
 strategy equilibria with declining prices re-
 quire nondecreasing absolute risk aversion,
 something that does not seem to character-
 ize individuals' attitudes toward risk. De-
 creasing absolute risk aversion is compatible
 with mixed-strategy equilibria, but when
 bidders randomize their bids, the auction
 need not be ex post efficient, as someone
 other that the highest-valuation bidder may
 win an object. This raises the possibility of
 resale.
 In this paper, we first consider a simple
 variant in which each bidder's valuations
 are identically distributed across the objects
 to be auctioned but are not perfectly corre-
 lated. We find that even though bidders are
 risk-neutral, mean sale prices fall. Second,
 we determine which object should be auc-
 tioned first when bidder valuations are not
 identically distributed across objects.
 We seek to capture phenomena such as
 bidding by a firm for construction contracts,
 oil drilling concessions, or workers, where
 because of constraints imposed by its physi-
 cal resources or the number of its job open-
 ings, each bidder is limited in the number of
 objects it can acquire. The model probably
 does not explain declining prices in the much
 discussed case of wine auctions. This is be-
 cause, while bidders may have limited
 (purchasing) capacities, it seems unlikely
 that a bidder's valuation would differ across
 identical lots of wine: a rose is a rose is a
 rose.
 The intuition for why prices fall in the
 sequential auction of independently dis-
 tributed, stochastically equivalent objects is
 most easily understood by comparison with
 Weber's (1983) model of a second-price se-
 quential auction of identical items. Weber
 shows that the symmetric equilibrium
 strategies call for agents to bid less than
 their valuations in earlier auctions to ac-
 count for the option value of participating
 in later auctions, the profit they expect to
 earn were they to participate in subsequent
 auctions. Because the objects are identical,
 bidders with higher valuations in the first
 round have higher option values, so they
 discount their early bids by a greater amount
 than low-valuation bidders. All gains to
 waiting are arbitraged away, and the ex-
 pected sale price in the two auctions is the
 same.
 In the present model, when submitting
 their bids in the first auction, bidders recog-
 nize that if they do not win, then all bidders
 in the second auction expect the same profit
 from bidding on the second object. Since
 this option value is the same for each
 first-auction participant, each discounts its
 bid in the first auction by the same amount.
 * Department of Economics, Queen's University,
 Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6 Canada, and Department of
 Economics, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712,
 respectively. We are grateful to Anne Sholtz, Ruqu
 Wang, and an anonymous referee for helpful com-
 ments. Both authors acknowledge financial support
 from SSHRC.
 tAshenfelter (1989) and McAfee and Vincent (1993)
 investigate auctions of identical cases of wine; Ashen-
 felter and Genesove examine auctions of (virtually
 identical) condominiums.
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 Consequently, relative to when objects are
 exactly identical, when objects are stochasti-
 cally identical, bidders with high valuations
 in the first round discount their bids by less,
 and those with low valuations discount by
 more. The key to the declining-price result
 is that, when there are sufficiently many
 bidders, it is usually bidders with high valu-
 ations who determine the price in the first
 auction; the reduced discount of these bid-
 ders is what leads expected prices to fall in
 later auctions.
 We then show that sellers of objects with
 different distributions of buyer valuations
 should first auction objects that feature the
 greatest variation in buyer valuations. For
 instance, if the distribution of valuations for
 one object is degenerate, it should be auc-
 tioned last. Then bidders do not discount
 their bids in the first auction, and the iden-
 tity of the winner of the first object has no
 effect on the sale price in the second auc-
 tion. Were the auction order reversed, then
 the bids for the sure object would be dis-
 counted by the expected profits from partic-
 ipating in the second auction, and the
 "wrong" bidder may win the first auction.
 Selling the object with the less dispersed
 buyer valuations last minimizes both the
 discount of bids from true valuations in the
 first auction and the cost of having fewer
 bidders in the second.
 I. The Model.
 There are N ? 3 bidders who may bid for
 two objects that are to be auctioned sequen-
 tially in second-price, sealed-bid, private-
 value auctions. There is no entry fee, and
 resale is prohibited. Further, each bidder
 can win only one object. Bidders do not
 know their own valuations of the second
 object until after the first auction has taken
 place.2 We initially assume that each agent's
 valuations are drawn from identical and in-
 dependent distributions.
 Let h1(*) be the continuous density from
 which bidders draw their (bounded, posi-
 tive) valuations of object j. Let vii be i's
 valuation of object j and let 7rij be i's
 expected profit in auction j (which may be
 conditioned on Vi1, Vi). Let bij be the bid i
 submits in auction j. Define fj(n) to be the
 first-order statistic in auction j when there
 are n bidders and let s3(n) be the second-
 order statistic.
 In the second auction, each bidder sub-
 mits a bid equal to its valuation, and the
 winner pays the second-highest bid. Each
 agent has ex ante identical chances of win-
 ning. Hence, bidders expect second-auction
 profits of
 ri2f -1) = N1E{f2(N -1)- s2(N-1)}. N-1
 Here, ri2 is the option value of not winning
 the first auction. This is equal to the value
 of participating in the second auction since
 a bidder can only win one object. In the first
 auction, standard arguments demonstrate
 that a bidder's equilibrium strategy is to
 shade his bid by the expected value of par-
 ticipation in the second auction, 7Mi2: bid-
 ding below V1i - 7i2 reduces the probability
 of winning in the first auction only when the
 gain exceeds the expected value of partici-
 pation in the second auction; bidding above
 uil- 7ri2 increases the probability of win-
 ning only when the expected profit is less
 than the expected value of participation in
 the second auction. Recognizing that bids
 must be nonnegative, this reasoning implies
 (1) bi1( 1v) = max{O, Vi1 - wi2} -
 Assuming that the minimum valuation ex-
 ceeds Ti2, expected sale prices are then
 E(P1) = E{s1(N)}
 1
 - 1 E{f2(N-1)-s2(N-1)} N-1
 E(P2) = E{S2(N-1)}.
 2In independent work, Ian L. Gale and Donald B.
 Hausch (1992) consider a two-bidder version of Exam-
 ple 1, in which each bidder knows both of its object
 valuations prior to the first auction. They show that
 declining prices still emerge when the information
 structure is changed in this way. One conjectures that
 the result extends to more competitive auctions featur-
 ing more than two bidders.
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 Taking differences and rearranging we find
 (2) E(P,)-E(P2)
 - E{s1(N))
 - NE f2(N-1)+ Ns2(N-1)}j.
 That is, the difference in expected sale prices
 is equal to the expected second-order statis-
 tic with N bidders minus a weighted aver-
 age of the first- and second-order statistics
 when there are N -1 bidders.
 Example 1: Suppose valuations are inde-
 pendently and uniformly distributed on
 [1,2]. In auction 2, the expected first- and
 second-order statistics are 1 + (N - 1)/N
 and 1+ (N - 2)/N, respectively, so that the
 winner's expected profit is 1/N. In the first
 auction, each bidder shaves 1/[(N - 1)N]
 from his valuation when bidding. The ex-
 pected sale price in the first auction is then
 as follows:3
 E(P1)
 = 1 + (N-1)/(N + 1) -1/[(N-1)N]
 > E(P2)
 =1+(N-2)/N for N>3.
 Example 2: Suppose valuations are inde-
 pendently and identically distributed and
 take on the value 2 with probability p and 1
 with probability 1- p. Then the expected
 sale prices in each auction are given by
 E(P1) = 2[1-(1 _p)N _ Np(1 _p)N-1
 + 1|(1 - p)N Np(1 - P) N1
 N-2
 -p(l-p))
 L1(- P)N-
 - (N - 1)p(l - P)N-2
 =2-(1- _p )N-1
 - (N -1)p(l- pN2
 so that
 E(P1) - E(P2)
 = p(l_ p)N-2[(N - l)p -1]
 1+p
 >0 if N>
 p
 These examples illustrate that when there
 are sufficiently many bidders that the ex-
 pected second-highest bidder has a high val-
 uation, then relative to when identical ob-
 jects are auctioned, the average amount by
 which the second-highest bidder discounts
 his first-auction bid from its true values is
 less. The consequence is that average sale
 prices fall.
 The above analysis assumes that a seller
 will accept a bid below the lowest possible
 valuation of any bidder in the first auction.
 If the seller sets a reserve price equal to the
 lowest possible bidder valuation, this re-
 duces the ability of a low-valuation bidder
 in the first auction to shade his bid, further
 driving up the difference between the first
 auction price and the second.
 There are two interesting cases to con-
 sider: (i) participation in the first auction is
 a precondition for participation in the sec-
 ond auction, so that a low-valuation bidder
 submits the reserve price; (ii) a bidder can
 participate in either auction so that a low-
 valuation bidder does not bid in the first
 auction because its maximum profit there is
 less than the value of participating in the
 second auction.
 Continuing Example 2, in the first sce-
 nario, where a low-valuation bidder submits
 3When N = 3, the expected sale price in each auc-
 tion is the same.
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 the reserve price of 1, the expected price
 and hence profit in the second auction are
 unaffected by the reserve price, but the ex-
 pected price in the first auction is increased
 by [(1 - p)N + Np(l - p)N- 1]p(1- p)N-2 to
 E(P1) = 2[1 -(1 - Np(l _ p)NN]
 + 1[(1-p) + Np(- p)N1
 [1-(1 - Np(1_ p)N1]
 X p(l p)N-2
 = 2- (1 - p)N _ Np(l _ p)N-1
 X[p(l1P)N-2.
 In the second scenario, with probability
 (1- p)N, no one participates in the first
 auction, so that the first object is not sold
 and there are N bidders in the second
 auction. Consequently, the expected price
 in the second auction is increased by
 (N - 1)p2(1 _ p)2N-2 to
 E(P2) = 2- [1 - (1 - p)N]
 X[(l- p)N-1 + (N - 1)p(1 - p)N-2]
 -(1_ p)N[(l_ p)N + Np(1 - p)N-1]
 The expected price in the first auction, given
 that there is a sale, is increased to
 E(P1) [ 1 ( 1 _ p)N _Np(l_p)N-]
 x {2- p(1 - p)N-2[1- p(_- p)N-1])
 Np(l1 - p -1
 + N
 > [1 _ (1 p)N _ Np(1p)N-1]
 x [2- p(1 _ p)N-2]
 + [(1- p)N + Np(l _ p)N-111
 which exceeds the expected price in the first
 auction were there no reserve price by
 [ _ 1P)N+ Np(l_p)N-1 p(,_p)N-2
 (an increase which exceeds that in the sec-
 ond auction).
 The reserve price only binds in the first
 auction. Hence, introducing a reserve price
 equal to the lowest possible bidder valua-
 tion drives up the expected sale price in
 the first auction, thus magnifying the
 "declining-price anomaly."
 II. Different Objects
 Suppose the seller plans to auction two
 objects with different distributions of buyer
 valuations. Which object should the seller
 auction first? The answer is unambiguous if
 buyer valuation distributions can be ordered
 by the, following notion of dispersion.
 Definition: Buyer valuation distribution A is
 said to have more dispersed order statistics
 than distribution B if
 (3) {fA(N - 1)} - E{SA(N - 1)}
 > E{fB(N-1)}- E{sB(N-1)}
 (4) E{sA(N)}- E{SA(N-1)}
 > E{SB(N)} - E{SB(N - 1)}
 where fk is the first-order statistic and Sk is
 the second-order statistic from buyer valua-
 tion distribution k, k = A, B.
 For example, if the cumulative distribu-
 tion of a bidder's valuations satisfies
 HA(x)=HB(x/a+c),a>1 Vx
 (e.g., valuations are uniformly distributed
 and distribution A has a greater support),
 then distribution A has more dispersed or-
 der statistics than B. Similarly, if the valua-
 tion distribution B is degenerate, then dis-
 tribution A is more dispersed than B. In
 many common families of bidder valuation
 distributions the notion of dispersion of or-
 der statistics either corresponds to a mea-
 sure of variance (e.g., normal, uniform,
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 (5) E{SA(N)} - [E{fB(N-1)} -E(SB(N ))] +E{SB(N-1)}
 N-1
 - 1 B [E{tA(N-1)}-E{S )}N-1 + ESA(N-1)J]
 = [E{SA(N)}- E{SA(N-1)}] - [E{SB(N)}- E{SB(N-1)}]
 [E{fA(N-1)}-E{SA(N-1)}] [E{fB(N-1)}-E{SB(N-1)}]
 +
 N-1 N-i
 Poisson, two-point distributions) or is cap-
 tured by one of the parameters characteriz-
 ing the distribution.
 PROPOSITION 1: Suppose the distribution
 of buyer valuations for object A is more dis-
 persed than the distribution for object B. Then
 the seller's expected revenues are greater if
 object A is auctioned first.
 PROOF:
 The difference in expected profit from
 auctioning object A before B is given by
 equation (5) above. The first line of the
 right-hand side of (5) is positive from (4),
 and (3) implies that the second line of (5) is
 positive.
 Stated intuitively, when the object with
 the greater dispersion in buyer valuations is
 auctioned first, there are more bidders
 around to bid up the price. As well, the
 expected profits associated with purchasing
 good B are lower, so that bidders do not
 discount their first bids by as much. This is
 easiest to see when the distribution of valu-
 ations for object B is degenerate. If B is
 auctioned first, each bidder discounts its
 valuation by its expected profit from partici-
 pating in the second auction. Further, if the
 winner of object B had one of the two
 highest valuations of good A, then the sale
 price of object A is reduced as well. In
 contrast, if A is auctioned first, then bidders
 do not discount their bids for A, since there
 is no profit from winning object B in the
 second auction.
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